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ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR THE UNDERSECURED
CREDITOR
IN A CHAPTER
11
REORGANIZATION:
COMPENSATION
FOR THE
DELAY
IN
ENFORCING FORECLOSURE RIGHTS

*LAURIS

N.

MOLBERT

Consider the following scenario: Debtor, in default and
threatened with foreclosure, files a petition under chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Code).1 At the time of the filing of the petition,
Debtor is indebted to Lender in the amount of $2,000,000.
Although Debtor has pledged collateral as security for the
repayment of the indebtedness, the collateral has a value of only
$1,000,000. Thus, Debtor has no equity in the collateral and lender
is substantially undersecured.
Ordinarily, Lender has the state law right to immediately
repossess and sell the collateral. 2 After deducting the costs of the
repossession and sale, Lender would reinvest the proceeds of the
collateral sale. Presumably, Lender could then once again obtain
3
an economic return on its investment.
* B.S.B.A. University of North Dakota; J.D. University of North Dakota; Certified Public
Accountant, North Dakota; Member, North Dakota and Minnesota State Bars; Associate, Conmy,
Feste, Bossart, Hubbard & Corwin, Ltd., Fargo, North Dakota.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat, 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. S§ 101-151326 (1982)).
2. See U.C.C. § 9-503 (1978). Under S 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, Lender has "on
default the right to take possession of the collateral." Id. See also Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 22,
-,
484 P.2d 164, 169 (1971) (on default, debtor loses right to possession and retains only
contingent right to the surplus on the sale of the collateral, if any),
Although not an exclusive remedy, Lender may sell the collateral after default and use the
proceeds from the sale towards the indebtedness. U.C.C. S 9-504.
3. Although Lender will forego the original contract rate of interest with Debtor, Lender will be
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Debtor, by filing the bankruptcy petition, prevents Lender
4
from exercising the right to repossess and sell the collateral.
Lender must now await the outcome of Debtor's Chapter 11
reorganization attempt. 5 Consequently, Lender must for some
uncertain period of time forego the opportunity to repossess the
collateral and reinvest the proceeds.
This Article will address the issue of whether Debtor must
compensate Lender for this delay in exercising the right to
repossess and sell the collateral during the pendency of the
bankruptcy case. This issue will face the bankruptcy practitioner in
every situation where no equity exists in the collateral 6 and the
collateral is necessary for an effective reorganization. 7
able to earn the market rate of interest in effect at the time of the reinvestment of the collateral sale
proceeds.
4. See 11 U.S.C. S 362 (a) (1982). Pursuant to S 362(a) of the Code, the filing of the petition
operates as an automatic stay of all acts against the Debtor or the Debtor's property. Id. Section
362(a) provides as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section
301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a) (3) of the
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a) (3)), operates as a stay,
applicable to all entities, of(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment
of process, of ajudicial, administrative, or other proceeding against the debtor
that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case
under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the
estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien
to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement
of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor;
and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United
States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
1d.
For a discussion of the S 362 automatic stay, see Kennedy, Automatic Stays under the New
Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MtcH. J.L. REF. 3 (1978).
5. There are only three possible outcomes of a Chapter 11 reorganization attempt: (1) a
dismissal of the bankruptcy case, 11 U.S.C. S 1112; (2) a conversion of the case to a case proceeding
under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, id.; or (3) the confirmation of a plan of reorganization, id.
1129.
6. If the Lender is oversecured rather than undersecured, there seems to be little dispute among
bankruptcy courts that the oversecured creditor is entitled to interest on its claim during the interim
period from the filing of the petition to the confirmation of a plan. See Federal Land Bank v. Carson,
34 Bankr. 502 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983) (adequate protection requires protection from continuing
erosion of equity cushion by post petition accruing interest); Heritage Savings & Loan Assoc. v.
Rogers Dev. Corp., 2 Bankr. 679 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980); Vlahos v. Pitts, 2 Bankr. 476 (Bankr
C.D. Cal. 1979). But see O'Toole, Adequate Protectionand Postpetition Interest in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 56
Am. BANKR. L.J. 251 (1982) (oversecured creditor is not entitled to adequate protection of
postpetition interest).
7. If there is no equity in the collateral and the collateral is not necessary for an effective
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This Article will focus on the legislative history8 and recent
bankruptcy decisions regarding the concept of adequate protection
under the Code. 9 In addition, this Article will address the issue of
whether compensation for delay in exercising foreclosure rights is
constitutionally required. 10
I. THE ABILITY TO REPOSSESS AND REINVEST THE
COLLATERAL SALE PROCEEDS IS A VALUABLE
RIGHT OF THE SECURED CREDITOR
The right to repossess the collateral and use the proceeds of the
collateral sale is the essence of secured lending. 1 Indeed, the
existence of collateral is the only basic difference between a secured
creditor and an unsecured creditor. 12 The right to repossess and sell
the collateral also has a very real economic value to the secured
creditor. First, it provides a method of repaying the indebtedness.
Second, it assures, to the extent of the value of the collateral, an
almost immediate repayment of the indebtedness and the ability to
reinvest the repayment in the marketplace.
A delay in repossessing and selling the collateral has a very
real cost. For example, assuming an annual market interest rate of
15% and a collateral value of $1,000,000, Lender will incur an
opportunity cost of $130,435 if the right to repossess and sell the
collateral is delayed for only one year.13 Thus, the delay in
repossessing and selling the collateral has an ascertainable and real
cost to a secured creditor.
reorganization, the secured creditor is entitled to relief from the automatic stay regardless of the
existence of adequate protection. 11 U.S.C. S 362 (d) (2) (1982).
8. See infra notes 20-52 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 53-76 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 77-91 and accompanying text.
I I. CitiCorp Homeowners, Inc. v. Western Surety Co., 131 Ariz. 334, -, 641 P.2d 248, 250
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (the most important remedy available to a secured creditor is the right to take
possession of the collateral following the debtor's default).
12. See Winters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Saker, 66 Ohio App.2d 31,
-, 419 N.E.2d 890,
893-94 (1979) (the existence of collateral provides an additional remedy to the standard remedies of
the unsecured creditor).
13. See PROFESSIONAL PUBLISHING CORP., REALTY BLtUEBOOK A-262 to 264 (1980. The following
table sets out the value to the secured creditor of collateral proceeds received in different years at
dliflircn-t market interest rates:

Collateral
Value
$1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000

Market
Interest
Rate
10%
15%
20%

Cost of Delay of Foreclosure
Value of collateral proceeds if
received at the end of
Year 1
Year 2
$909,091
869,565
833,333

$826,447
756,144
694,445

Year 3
$751,316
657,517
578,704
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The commencement of the bankruptcy case results in an
14
automatic stay of all acts by a secured creditor to enforce its liens.
The policy behind this extraordinary power of the automatic stay is
twofold.
First, the Code drafters intended the automatic stay to give the
debtor a "breathing spell" from his creditors. 15 Second, the
automatic stay was intended to prevent one creditor from rushing
to the courthouse resulting in harm to the other creditors of the
debtor. 16 In other words, the Code attempts to treat all similarly
situated creditors equally.
Although Congress recognized the need to enjoin lien
enforcement, it tempered the automatic stay by imposing
counterbalancing safeguards.' 7 One of these safeguards is the right
of a secured creditor to "adequate protection" of its interest during
the pendency of the bankruptcy case. 18 Adequate protection is not,
14. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982). For the text of § 362(a), see supra note 4.
15. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT],
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONe. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6296-97. See also Barclays Bank of New York v.
Saypol, 31 Bankr. 796, 799 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1982). The House Report provides as follows:
It [the automatic stay] gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all
collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to
attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial
pressures that drove him into bankruptcy.
HOUSE REPORT, supra.

16. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 341, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws at 6298. See also
Saypol, 31 Bankr. at 799.
17. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), (e)(1982). The Bankruptcy Code provides two interrelated limits
on the power of the automatic stay. First, a creditor is entitled to adequate protection. 11 U.S.C. §
362(d) (1). Second, the creditor is entitled to a prompt hearing on its request for relief from the
automatic stay. Id. 5 362(e). Under certain circumstances a creditor can obtain relief from the
automatic stay exparte. Id. §362(0.
18. See Id. § 362(d)(1), (e). Basically, the secured creditor can use two approaches to obtain
adequate protection of its interest. First, the secured creditor can seek relief from the automatic stay.
Id. § 362(d)(1). Section 362(d)(1) provides as follows:
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall
grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by
terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay -

(I) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in
property of such party in interest....
Id.
Second, a secured creditor can demand adequate protection of its collateral, if its collateral is to
be used, sold or leased. Id. § 363(e). Section 363(e) provides as follows:
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time, on request of an
entity that has an interest in property used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used,
sold, or leased, by the trustee, the court shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or
lease as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest. In any hearing
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however, specifically defined in the Code. 19 What is adequate and
what must be protected requires an examination of the legislative
history of the concept of adequate protection.
A.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Section 361 of the Code contains three nonexclusive 2 0 means
of providing adequate protection to the creditor with an interest in
the debtor's property. 2 First, the debtor in possession (or trustee)
may make periodic cash payments to the creditor to the extent that
22
the value of the creditor's interest in the property has decreased.
Second, the debtor in possessing may provide the creditor with an
additional or replacement lien to the extent that the value of the
creditor's interest in the property has decreased. 23 Third, the court
may grant other relief that will permit the creditor to realize the
24
"indubitable equivalent" of its interest in the property.
Unfortunately, section 361 does not indicate what is to be
protected but only how to provide adequate protection. The
language used by Congress in section 361 is not, however, without
significance in determining what is to be protected.
under this section, the trustee has the burden of proof on the issue of adequate
protection.
Id.
19. See House REPORT, supra note 15, at 338-39, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS at 6295.
Congress intended adequate protection to be a flexible concept, with the definition "left to a case-bycase interpretation." Id.
20. See 11 U.S.C. S361 (1982). Although the list contained in § 361 is nonexclusive, § 361 does
specifically preclude the use of an administrative priority for adequate protection. See id. § 361(3).
Since administrative claims are only paid if unencumbered assets are available, Congress apparently
concluded that an administrative priority was too speculative to constitute adequate protection. S.
REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT], reprintedin 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5840. See also Comment, Compensation for Time Value as Part of
Adequate ProtectionDuring the Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 305, 313 (1983).
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1982).
22. Id. 5 361(1). Section 361 provides as follows:
When adequate protection is required under section 362, 363, or 364 of this title of an
interest of an entity in property, such adequate protection may be provided by (1) requiring the trustee to make periodic cash payments to such entity, to the
extent that the stay under section 362 of this title, use, sale, or lease under
section 363 of this title, or any grant of a lien under section 364 of this title
results in a decrease in the value of such entity's interest in such property;
(2) providing to such entity an additional or replacement lien to the extent that
such stay, use, sale, lease, or grant results in a decrease in the value of such
entity's interest in such property; or
(3) granting such other relief, other than entitling such entity to compensation
allowable under section 503(b) (1) of this title as an administrative expense, as
will result in the realization by such entity of the indubitable equivalent of such
entity's interest in such property.
Id. S 361.
23. Id. 5361(2).
24. Id. 5361(3).
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Sections 361(1) and 361(2) provide for adequate protection to
the extent that the automatic stay "results in a decrease in the value
of such entity's interest in such property." 25 If Congress intended
the term "value" to include not only the tangible value of
collateral, but also the intangible value of other rights relating to
collateral, such as the right to repossess and sell the collateral, then
adequate protection must compensate a secured creditor for the
delay in exercising foreclosure rights.
Both the House and Senate Reports indicate a concern for
protecting the tangible value of the collateral from a decline due to
physical
depreciation. 26 Congress'
concern
for physical
depreciation would not, however, preclude a desire to protect other
27
aspects of a secured creditor's interest in collateral.
The House Report indicates that the concept of adequate
protection was intended to protect the secured creditor's bargain.
The House Report states that section 361 ensures that the secured
creditor will receive essentially what it bargained for:
Secured creditors should not be deprived of the benefit of
their bargain. There may be situations in bankruptcy
where giving a secured creditor an absolute right to his
bargain may be impossible or seriously detrimental to the
bankruptcy laws. Thus, this section [ 361] recognizes the
availability of alternate means of protecting a secured
25. If U.S.C. 5 361(1), (2) (emphasis added).
26. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 338-40, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6295-96;
SENATE REPORT supra note 14, at 54, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5840. The Senate
Report contains the only explicit reference to the amount to be paid for purposes of adequate
protection. The Senate Report provides as follows:
This provision [S 361(1)] is derived from In re Bermec Corporation, 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir.
1971 ), though in that case it is not clear whether the payments offered were adequate
to compensate the secured creditors for their loss. The use of periodic payments may
be appropriate where, for example, the property in question is depreciating at a
relatively fixed rate. The periodic payments would be to compensate for the
depreciation and might, but need not necessarily, be in the same amount as payments
due on the secured obligation.
Id.
In Bermec the Second Circuit could not find as clearly erroneous the lower court's finding that
the secured creditor was adequately protected. In re Bermec Corp. 445 F.2d 367, 369 (2d Cir. 1971).
The Second Circuit concluded that the trustee would be able to "pay the economic depreciation."
Id. The court did not, however, describe what constitutes economic depreciation. Thus, the B-.'nec
case sheds little light on what value Congress intended to protect.
27. SeeHOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 338, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6295. The
House Report suggests that the courts should broadly interpret the rights entitled to protection:
The interests of which the court may provide protection in the ways described in this
section [§ 361] include equitable as well as legal interests. For example, a right to
redeem under a pledge or a right to recover property under a consignment are both
interests that are entitled to protection.
Id., 1978 U.S. CoDECoNG. &AD. NEwsat 6295.
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creditor's interest. Though the creditor might not receive
his bargain in kind, the purpose of the section is to insure
that the secured creditor receives in value essentially what
he bargained for.2
The right to repossess and sell collateral is an important part of
the secured creditor's bargain.2 9 Although the debtor is entitled to
use and possess the collateral in his attempt to reorganize,3 0 the
House Report indicates that the secured creditor is entitled to
protection of the value of the bargain with the debtor. 31 Thus, while
the secured creditor cannot obtain its bargain in kind by
repossessing and selling the collateral, the debtor must protect the
bargain by providing alternative means of compensation for its
declining value due to the delay in exercising its foreclosure rights.
Although sections 361(1) and 361(2) set forth specific examples
of adequate protection methods, the last alternative method in
32
section 361(3) was intended by Congress as a catch-all provision.
Section 361(3) provides that adequate protection may be sufficient
if it "results in the realization...

of the indubitable equivalent of such

entity's interest in such property. ""
The indubitable equivalent language was not initially part of
section 361(3).3' The House's original version of section 361(3)
provided for "such other relief as will result in the realization by
such entity of the value of such entity interest in property." 3 5 As a
compromise between the House and Senate versions, the conferees
inserted the term indubitable equivalent in section 361(3).36
The indubitable equivalent language appeared initially in the
Senate's version of section 1129 of the Code, which deals with the
requirements for the confirmation of a reorganization plan. 3 7 The
Senate Report regarding section 1129 indicates that the term
derives from Judge Learned Hand's opinion in In re Murel Holding
Corp. 38
28. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 339, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6295.
29. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
30. 11 U.S.C. S 1108 (1982) (debtor in possession may continue to operate the business).
31. HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 339, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws at 6295.
32. W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 361.01[04] (L. King 15th ed. 1984).
33. 11 U.S.C. S361(3) (1982) (emphasis added).
34. 124 CONG. REC. 32,395 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards). See also H.R. 8200, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 361 (1978); S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. S 361 (1978).
35. H.R. 8200, S 361(4).
36. 124 CONG. REC. 32,395 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 124 CONG. REC. 33,495 (1978)
(statement of Sen. DeConcini). The compromise also removed from the original House Bill the use
of an administrative expense as a method of providing adequate protection. Id. at 33,994-95.
37. SENATE REPORT, supra note 20, at 127, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NFws at 5913. The
indubitable equivalent language is also contained in S 1129 as enacted. See 11 U.S.C. S 1129(b) (2) (a)
(iii) 1982.
38. SENATE REPORT, supra note 20, at 127, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5913. The
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In Murel a secured creditor appealed from an order denying
relief from a stay of its right to foreclose. 39 The debtors' proposed
plan of reorganization required the secured creditor to forego
amortization payments on the indebtedness for a period of ten
years with payment in full on the tenth year.4 0 During the interim,
the debtor in Murel proposed interest on the amount due at the rate
4
of five and one-half percent annually. 1
On appeal, the secured creditor argued that its interest was not
adequately protected. 4 2 Judge Hand agreed and commented on the
concept of adequate protection as follows:
It is plain that "adequate protection" must be completely
compensatory; and that payment ten years hence is not
generally the equivalent of payment now. Interest is
indeed the common measure of the difference, but a
creditor who fears the safety of his principal will scarcely
be content with that; he wishes to get his money or at least
the property. We see no reason to suppose that the statute
was intended to deprive him of that in the interest of
junior holders, unless by a substitute of the most
43
indubitable equivalence.
Judge Hand's interpretation of the concept of adequate
protection clearly places emphasis on the time value component of
money. As aptly stated by Judge Hand, "payment ten years hence
is not generally the equivalent of payment now. ""4 By using the
indubitable equivalent language in section 361, it seems apparent
that Congress certainly envisioned compensation for delay in
45
exercising foreclosure rights as a part of adequate protection.
Congress also included the indubitable equivalent language in
Senate Report state that "[tjhe indubitable equivalent language is intended to follow the strict
approach taken by Judge Learned Hand in In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2nd Cir. 1935)."
Id.
39. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941, 941 (2d Cir. 1935). Under
77B of the old Act, the stay was not automatic; instead the debtor was required to seek an order
staying any attempt by a creditor to enforce its liens. Act ofJune 7, 1934, ch. 424, 48 Stat. 911 (1934)
(repealed 1978).
40. 75 F.2d at 942.
41. Id.
42. See id.Judge Hand concluded that if secured creditors do not consent to the proposed
treatment in a plan, the plan "'must provide adequate protection for the realization by them . . .of
the full value of their interest, claims or liens."' Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426, 434 (9th Cir.
1984). Commenting on the overall significance of the use of the phrase "indubitable equivalent" in
. 361, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that "it at least encourages if not requires a
present value analysis under section 361." Id. For a more detailed discussion of American Mariner see
infra
notes 43-57 and accompanying text.
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section 1129 of the Code.4 6 Section 1129 sets out the requirements
for a confirmable plan of reorganization. 47 A plan of reorganization

may be confirmed over the objection of dissenting creditors if the
plan complies with the cram-down provisions of section 1129.48 A
plan that provides for periodic cash payments that equal the present

value of the secured creditor's claim would comply with the cramdown provisions of section 1129.49

As an alternative method to the deferred cash payments, a
cram-down plan may provide "for the realization. . . of the
indubitable equivalent" of the secured claims.50 The use of
indubitable equivalent as an alternative to deferred cash payments
indicates, therefore, that Congress recognized that the indubitable
51
equivalent language implied a present value connotation.
The indubitable equivalent language in section 361 coupled
with the intention to protect the secured creditor's bargain, leads to
the conclusion that Congress intended to compensate the secured
creditor for the delay in exercising its right to repossess and sell the
collateral.
46. See II U.S.C. 5 1129(b) (2) (A) (iii) (1982).
47.See Id. 51129(a).
48.See Id. 5 1129(b). The cram-down phraseology comes from the ability of the bankruptcy court
to confirm a plan of reorganization notwithstanding the failure to obtain the acceptance of all
1129.01.
creditors. See generally COLLIER, supra note 32,
49. See 11 U.S.C. S 1129(b). Section 1129(b) provides as follows:
(b) (1) Notwithstanding section 510(a) of this title, if all of the applicable
requirements of subsection (a) of this section other than paragraph (8) are met with
respect to a plan, the court, on request of the proponent of the plan, shall confirm the
plan notwithstanding the requirements of such paragraph if the plan does not
discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or
interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and
equitable with respect to a class includes the following requirements:
(A) with respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides(i) (1) that the holders of such claims retain the lien securing such
claims, whether the property subject to such lien is retained by the
debtor or transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed
amount of such claims; and
(11) that each holder of a claim of such class receive an account of
such claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount
of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least
the value of such holder's interest in the estate's interest in such
property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363 (k) of this title, of any
property that is subject to the lien securing such claims, free and clear of
such lien, with such lien to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and the
treatment of such lien on proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this
subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent
of such claims.
Id.
50.See Id. 1129(b) (2) (A) (iii).
51. See HousE REPORT, supra note 15, at 414, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6370

524

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

60:515

B. Case Law
Courts have split on the issue of whether adequate protection
requires compensation for delay in exercising foreclosure rights.5 2
The leading case supporting the proposition that adequate
protection requires compensation for delay in exercising
foreclosure rights is the Ninth Circuit's decision in Crocker National
Bank v. American MarinerIndustries, Inc.53
In American Mariner, an undersecured creditor appealed from
bankruptcy court and bankruptcy appellate panel decisions
denying its request for relief from the automatic stay. 54 The sole
issue on appeal was whether the undersecured creditor was entitled
to compensation under the concept of adequate protection for the
55
delay in enforcing its lien rights.
At the time the secured creditor, Crocker National, requested
relief from the automatic stay, the indebtedness owed by its debtor,
American Mariner, amounted to $365,000.56 The collateral
securing American Mariner's indebtedness had a liquidation value
of $130,500. 5 7 As adequate protection Crocker National sought
monthly cash payments equal to the reinvestment value of the
collateral. 58
("This [5 1129 (b)] contemplates a present value analysis that will discount value to be received in
the future .... ").
52. For cases in which courts have concluded that adequate protection requires compensation
for delay in exercising foreclosure rights under S 361, seeCrocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner
Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984); Albion Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Langley, 30 Bankr. 595
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983): Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Monroe Park, 17 Bankr. 934 (Bankr. 1).
Del. 1982); United Va. Bank v. Virginia Foundry Co., 9 Bankr. 493 (Bankr. W.I). Va. 1981):
Midlanmic Nat'l Bankv. Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc., 4 Bankr. 635 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1980). Seealso
Comment, supra note 20.
For cases in which courts have come to an opposite conclusions, see: Lend Lease v. Briggs
Transp. Co., 35 Bankr. 210 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983); Norwest Bank Fargo v. Garnas, No. 8305232, slip op. (Bankr. D.N.D. Dec. 28, 1983); Aegean Fare, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Mass.,
Dep't of Revenue, 34 Bankr. 965 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Lima v.
Shriver, 33 Bankr. 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983); Fort Worth Mortgage Corp. v. Canirup, 32
Bankr. 1004 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); Barclays Bank ofN.Y., N.A. v. Saypol, 31 Bankr. 796 (Bankr.
S.). N.Y. 1983); General Elec. Mortgage Corp. v. South Village, Inc., 25 Bankr. 987 (Bankr. 1).
Utah 1982): In re Pine Lake Village Apt. Co., 19 Bankr. 819 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1982): Bankers Lifle
Ins. Co. ofNeb. v. Alyucan, 12 Bankr. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
53. 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984).
54. Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984). The
secured creditor, Crocker National, appealed from the bankruptcy court decision, 10 Bankr. 711
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981), which was affirmed by the bankruptcy appellate panel for the Ninth
Circuit, 27 Bankr. 1004 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983). 734 F.2d at 427.
55. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 427.
56. Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus., Inc., 27 Bankr. at 1005. On December
12, 1980, American Mariner filed its petition under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Less than
three months later, on February 23, 1981, Crocker National commenced a proceeding to obtain
relief from the stay. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. Crocker National sought monthly cash payments that would reflect a reinvestment at the
prime interest rate, at that time 19%, plus two percentage points. This amounted to approximately
$2300 per month. At some point, American Mariner offered payments of $1770 per month. Id.
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The bankruptcy court denied Crocker National's request for a
monthly cash payment equal to the reinvestment value on the
theory that section 506(b), 5 9 by negative implication, precludes
interest payments on undersecured claims. 60 Over a vigorous
dissent, 6 1 the bankruptcy appellate panel subsequently affirmed the
bankruptcy court. 62
The bankruptcy appellant panel disagreed, however, with the
bankruptcy court's conclusion that section 506(b), by negative
implication, precludes interest payments to undersecured
creditors. 63 Instead, the appellate panel concluded that merely as a
matter of bankruptcy policy, it was inconceivable that Congress
intended the debtor, while insolvent, to provide a market interest
rate to an undersecured creditor as a condition for maintaining the
64
automatic stay.
After reviewing the legislative history of section 361, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court and appellate panel. 65 The
court reasoned that Congress "well understood" the meaning of
the term indubitable equivalent when it was incorporated into
section 361.66 The Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress intended
59. 11 U.S.C. 5 506(b) (1982). Section 506(b) provides as follows:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of which,
after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater than the amount of
such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim,
and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided under the agreement under which
such claim arose.

Id.
60. Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus., Inc., 10 Bankr. at 712 (citing 11 U.S.C.
506(b) (Supp. v. 1981)). Although the bankruptcy court concluded no interest was due as a part of
adequate protection, it found that an offer of $1770 per month would be adequate protection for any
depreciation in the value of the collateral. Id. at 714. The court noted, however, that -[i]f no
progress is made within a reasonable time, the bank can reapply for relief of stay, or move to dismiss
or for conversion to a Chapter 7." Id.
61. 27 Bankr. at 1014 (Hughes, J., dissenting). Judge Hughes concluded that undersecured
creditors are entitled to compensation for the delay in repossessing their collateral. Id. at 1018.
Hughes noted that adequate protection assures the economic equivalent of the bargain struck, id. at
016-17, and that the creditor was entitled to the economic equivalent of the right to foreclose. Id. at
1018.
62. Id. the standard of review employed by the bankruptcy appellate panel was apparently
whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying the request for relief from the
automatic stay. Id.
63. Id. at 1009.
64. SeeId. at 1010. The bankruptcy appellate panel stated as follows:
All things considered, it is not possible, without engaging in strained construction, to
conclude that it was the intention of Congress, where the debtor is insolvent and the
collateral insufficient, that the automatic stay triggers interest, at market rate, on the
value of the collateral; nor was it intended that the undersecured creditor be entitled to
market rate interest from the date of bankruptcy forward, as a necessary condition for
maintaining the stay.

Id.
65. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 427.
66. Id. at 434. The Ninth Circuit concluded as follows: "After examining the origins of the
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to compensate the secured creditor for the harm that results to its
interest as a result of the automatic stay, including the cost
67
occasioned by the delay in foreclosing its lien.
In addition, the court noted that a different conclusion would
only result in an unwarranted windfall to the debtor and the
unsecured creditors at the expense of the undersecured creditor. 68
Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the undersecured creditor
"is entitled to compensation for the delay in enforcing its rights
during the interim between the petition and confirmation of the
plan. ''69
Perhaps the leading case supporting an opposite view is the
case of GeneralElectric Mortgage Corp. v. South Village, Inc. 70
In South Village a shopping mall owner filed a petition under
Chapter 11. General Electric Mortgage Corp., an undersecured
creditor, sought relief from the automatic stay. 71 At issue before the
South Village court was the identical issue facing the American
Mariner court - whether the undersecured creditor is entitled to
compensation as a part of adequate protection for the delay in
72
foreclosure.
In an exhaustive opinion, the South Village Court reviewed the
legislative history and concluded that Congress did not intend to
compensate an undersecured creditor for the delay in foreclosing its
liens. 73 The court reasoned that the automatic stay was only an
interim remedy that allows the debtor time to reorganize. 74
The court suggested that the secured creditor has other
remedies, such as submitting a creditor plan of reorganization or
liquidation or moving for a dismissal of the case. 75 In light of these
other remedies, the court in South Village determined that it would
76
not require the debtor to pay interest for the delay.
phrase [indubitable equivalent] and its use elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code, we conclude that it at
least encourages if not requires a present value analysis under Section 361." Id. at 432.
67. Id. at 435.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 25 Bankr. 987 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
71. General Elec. Mortgage Corp. v. South Village, Inc., 25 Bankr. 987, 988 (Bankr. D. Utah
1982). The evidence adduced at trial revealed that the secured creditor's debt equalled $4,369,000.
The value of the collateral amounted to $4,340,000. Interest continued to accrue on the indebtedness
at the rate of $1633 per day or $596,110 per year. The court found the collateral not sufficiently
increasing in value to cover the increasing indebtedness. Id.
72. See id. The secured creditor demanded periodic cash payments equal to the market rate of
interest. Id. at 989 n. 1.
73. Id. at 991-96. The South Village court did not find the inclusion of the term "indubitable
equivalent" to have much, if any, significance. Id. at 991 n.4. Although acknowledging the term
derives from Judge Hand's opinion in In re Murel Holding Co., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935), the court
concluded that the result in Murel was "fact-specific, not a categorical imperative." Id. at 992 n.4.
74. Id. at 1000.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1002. The court concluded that "[djebtors need not pay opportunity cost in light of
these antidotes for delay found in the Code." Id.
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CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Although the courts have split on the issue of whether
compensation for delay is required under the Bankruptcy Code, no
court has held that the Constitution requires such compensation.
Nonetheless, Congress' power to legislate bankruptcy law under
article I, section 8 of the Constitution is limited by the fifth
amendment."
In Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,78 the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional the Frazier-Lemke Act, which allowed
farmers in default to remain in possession of mortgaged property
during a five year stay of foreclosure. 79 During the five year period
of the stay, the farmer could purchase the property at its appraised
value.8 0 The purchase price could be paid by deferred payments
over a period of six years with an annual rate of one percent
8 1

interest.

The Supreme Court found that the Frazier-Lemke Act
stripped mortgagees of five traditional rights: (1) the right to retain
its lien until the indebtedness is repaid; (2) the right to a judicial
sale of mortgaged property; (3) the right to determine when such
sale should be held; (4) the right to bid at a judicial sale, and (5) the
right to control the property during default. 8 2 The Court concluded
that the stripping of these rights constituted a taking without just
83
compensation in violation of the fifth amendment.
In Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke"
85
the Court upheld a modified version of the Frazier-Lemke Act.
The Court found that the modified version protected three of the
five rights that it held impaired in Radford: (1) the right to retain its
liens until the indebtedness is paid; (2) the right to a judicial sale,
and (3) the right to bid at a judicial sale. 8 6 With the protection of
77. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589 (1935). "The bankruptcy
power, like the other great substantive powers of Congress, is subject to the Fifth Amendment." Id.
Congress, unlike the states, is not prohibited from impairing the obligations of contracts. Id.
78. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
79. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. at 575-76. See Frazier-Lemke Act,
ch. 869.48 Stat. 1289 (1934) (amended 1935, 1940).
80. Id. at 591.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 594-95.
83. Id. at 601-02.
84. 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
85. Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, 300 U.S. 440 (1937). See
Frazier-Lemke Act, ch. 792, 49 Stat. 942 (1935) (amended 1940) (expired by its own terms).
Congress redrafted the Frazier-Lemke Act to cure the constitutional defects enumerated in Radford.
300 U.S. at 457.
86. 300 U.S. at 458-59. Under the modified version of the Frazier-Lemke Act, the debtor could
retain possession of the property. The stay, however, remained in place for three years rather than
live years and the liens remained in place during the stay. Id. at 460.
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these rights, the Court concluded that the modified Frazier-Lemke
Act did not represent an unreasonable modification of the
87
creditor's rights.
In a subsequent case, Wright v. Union Central Life Insurance
Co.,88 the Supreme Court concluded that the debtor's right to
redeem mortgaged property at its appraised value was superior to
the creditor's right to have a judicial sale and the right to bid at the
sale. 8 9 Thus, Union Central in effect rendered meaningless the
secured creditor's rights supposedly constitutionally protected in
the modified version of the Frazier-Lemke Act. 90
Radford and its progeny indicate that, even without
compensation for delay in exercising foreclosure rights, the
automatic stay provisions contained in the Code are more
protective of creditors' rights than the Frazier-Lemke Act that the
United States Supreme Court upheld in Vinton and Union Central.91
Compensation for the delay in exercising foreclosure rights,
therefore, would not likely be constitutionally required.
V. CONCLUSION
Although compensation for delay in exercising foreclosure
rights would not likely be constitutionally required, adequate
protection and section 361 were not intended by Congress to be
confined to the constitutional requirements of the fifth
amendment. 92 Congress intended section 361 to provide protection
87. Id. at 470.
88. 311 U.S. 273 (1940).
89. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1940). In Union Central a
conflict arose between the creditor who desired a judicial sale and the debtor who desired to redeem
by paying an appraised value. Id. at 276. The Supreme Court held that the right to redeem
outweighed the right to a judicial sale. Id. at 279.
90. The right to a judicial sale and the right to bid at a judicial sale, as expressed in Vinton,
would have no value to the secured creditor if the debtor could redeem the collateral at its appraised
value. The third right, the retention of a lien, important in Vinton, is also rendered meaningless since
the lien could be discharged by the redemption. See Comment, supra note 20, at 310 n.24.
91. For instance, the Code places limitations on the use, sale, or lease of collateral. 11 U.S.C. 5
363 (1982). A creditor is entitled to a hearing on the automatic stay within 30 days of the request for
relief. Id. § 362(e). The secured creditor's liens remain in place throughout the bankruptcy
proceedings unless avoided under the avoidance powers of the Code. See id. §§ 522, 544, 545, 547,
548, 549, 724.
92. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 339, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6295. The
House Report provides as follows:
The concept [adequate protection] is derived from the fifth amendment protection of
property interests. See Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273 (1940);
LouisvilleJointStock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935). It is not intended to be
confined strictly to the constitutional protection required, however. The section [§
361], and concept of adequate protection, is based as much on policy grounds as on
constitutional grounds.
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for the secured creditor's bargain. 93 In addition, Congress intended
equitable
section 361 to further bankruptcy policy with a flexible
4
balancing approach to the various parties' interests. 9
At the outset of the bankruptcy case, the debtor is entitled to a
brief respite from the pressures of his creditors. 95 This enables the
debtor to propose and file a plan of reorganization. The Code gives
the debtor a 120-day exclusive time period for the filing of a plan of
reorganization. 9 6 Because the time period is fairly brief, the debtor
will probably not be required to compensate the secured creditor
for the delay in exercising its foreclosure rights. 97
After the 120-day time period has expired, the equities and
bankruptcy policy favor granting the under secured creditors
compensation for the delay as a part of adequate protection. First,
it would place desirable pressure on the debtor to move toward the
presentment and confirmation of a plan. 98 Had the debtor proposed
a plan of reorganization during the 120-day time period, the plan
would be required to either pay off the secured creditor's claim in
full on the effective date of the plan or provide deferred cash
payments with a present value equal to the secured claim. 99 Thus,
the debtor actually has a disincentive to move towards the filing of a
plan, unless the undersecured creditor can require, as a part of
adequate protection, compensation for the delay in exercising its
foreclosure rights.
Second, a prolongeduse of the collateral by the debtor enables
the debtor, in most instances, to produce income from the
collateral. At the same time, however, the value to the secured
creditor of the collateral sale proceeds diminishes in value.1 00 This
93. Id. ("The purpose of the section [S 361] is to insure that the secured creditor receives in
value essentially what he bargained for").
94. See id. The House Report states as follows: "It is expected that the courts will apply the
concept in light of [sic] facts of each case and general equitable principles. It is not intended that the
courts will develop a hard and fast rule that will apply in every case. Id. See also Albion Prod. Credit
Ass'n v. Langley, 30 Bankr. 595, 605 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983).
95. 30 Bankr. at 605. The court in Langley commented on the purpose of the automatic stay as
follows: "While the debtors are provided a respite from acts of creditors in order to get their affairs in
order and plan an approach to reorganization, they should not be allowed to string this protection
out over an unreasonable time period." Id.
96. 11 U.S.C. S 1121(b)(1982).
97. A balancing of the equities might not require compensation for such a short period of delay
in exercising foreclosure rights. However, if the tangible value of the collateral is depreciating rather
rapidly due to its use or tangible nature, adequate protection should be required during the initial
120-day time period as well.
98. 30 Bankr. at 605. The Langley court stated that "the purpose of the protection is
to facilitate rehabilitation where possible. It is desirable that some pressure be maintained -to move
debtors along toward presentment of a plan, especially where the debtors have the continued use of
another's collateral." Id. (emphasis in original). The bankruptcy court in American Mariner also
suggested this approach by commenting that "[i]f no progress is made within a reasonable time, the
bank can reapply for relief of stay, or move to dismiss or for conversion to a Chapter 7." 10 Bankr. at
714.
99. See 11 U.S.C. 5 1129 (1982).
100. 30 Bankr. at 605-06. The Langley c6urt commented, "The debtors should not be able to use
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results in an unequitable shift of the benefits of the collateral from
the secured creditor to the debtor and the unsecured creditors, at
the expense of the under secured creditor. 101
Third, compensation for delay in exercising foreclosure rights
as a part of adequate protection would be more desirable than other
remedies available to the secured creditor. For instance, the
secured creditor has the option of moving for the dismissal of the
bankruptcy case.' 0 2 An approach allowing compensation for the
delay in exercising foreclosure rights, however, is a more
reasonable alternative than the all or nothing approach the
103
bankruptcy case dismissal remedy would entail.
In sum, bankruptcy policy and legislative history indicate that
compensation for the delay in exercising foreclosure rights is a part
of the adequate protection that must be provided to an
undersecured creditor. During the initial 120-day time period set
aside for the debtor to file a plan, the equities might not favor
compensation for such a short delay. After that time period has
expired, however, the Bankruptcy Court should require the debtor
to compensate the secured creditor as a part of the concept of
adequate protection for the delay in exercising its foreclosure
rights.

this creditor's collateral to earn new money while at the same time the ability of the collateral to
satisfy the claim the creditor had on the date of filing isdiminishing." Id.
101. 734 F.2d at 435. The court in American Mariner stated as follows: "To the extent that the
debtor in bankruptcy can prevent the secured creditor from enforcing its rights against collateral
while the debtor benefits from the creditor's money, the debtor and his unsecured creditors receive a
windfall at the expense of the secured creditor." Id.
102. 11 U.S.C. S 1112(b) (1982). Section 1112(b) provides that the court may dismiss a case for
cause, including inability to effectuate a plan or unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial
to creditors. Id.
103. The all or nothing approach is suggested by the South Village court. General Elec. Mortgage
Corp..v. South Village, Inc., 25 Bankr. 987 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982). If the South Village approach is
followed, courts will be required to determine whether a reorganization attempt should be
discontinued in every instance in which a creditor is concerned about the erosion of its economic
interests. Rather than making such a life or death decision, the bankruptcy court should require the
debtor to pay compensation for the use of the collateral during the reorganization proceedings. If the
debtor is unable or unwilling to pay for the use of the collateral, relief from the automatic stay is a less
drastic remedy than the dismissal remedy proposed by South Village.

